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Discussion 
Gregory D. Hess 
Monetary policy and theory have been greatly transformed since Dale Hender-
son, Richard Porter, and Peter Tinsley (HPT) first crossed the Board's 
threshold more than thirty years ago. Judging from the sustained levels 
of robust growth and moderate rates of inflation in the United States since 
the ea_rly 1980s, both theory and policy have moved in a welfare-improving 
direction. The dramatic evolution of monetary policy during HIT's tenure 
simply cannot be overstated. A revolution took place during their watch, 
and as the custodians and facilitators of research at the Federal Reserve 
Board, these three amigos should certainly take some credit. 
ln my opinion, the fundamental change in policy during HPT' s tenure 
was the deregulation and the market-based evolution of monetary policy. 
On the domestic s ide of monetary policy, the Federal Reserve Board ended 
the active management of margin rates and reserve requirements that had 
earli er been considered irnpmtant tools of monetary policy. As well, the end 
of Regulation Q brought deregulation to the setting of deposit rates and 
allowed banks and financial institutions to offer new kinds of deposit-type 
products to their customers. On the international side, too, the Federal Reserve 
Board has operated in a post-Bretton Woods regime of floating exchange 
rates, and it has made great strides in the past ten years to avoid actively . 
intervening in foreign exchange markets. 
Not only has the Federal Reserve Board changed during HPT's 
tenure with respect to allowing a more market-based approach to imple-
menting monetary policy, but it has also adopted a stronger, though largely 
unstated, partial policy commitment to low inflation. Operationally, the Board 
has somewhat improved on transparency, especially if you like 150-word 
documents that get released eight times a year. And the Board has devoted 
a large amount of resources to make operational the policy implementation 
of disciplined approaches for stabilization of real growth and low inflation, 
such as those suggested by McCallum (1988) and Taylor (1993). 
While the Federal Reserve Board 's approach to monetary policy was 
changing, the academic study of applied and theoretical monetary economics 
was changing as well . When HPT came to the Board thirty years ago, 
applied monetary economics involved large-scale models, optimal con~ol 
theory, and a tendency to recommend policies that encouraged fine-turung. 
And then came the exodus. The policy irrelevance debate of Sargent and 
Wallace (1975) , the Lucas Critique (1976) of simulating policy changes 
when deep parameters are not identified, and the real business cycle models 
of Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Long and Plosser (1983) de~emphasized 
the academic study of applied monetary economics for a generation or two 
of graduate students. 
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The study of intermediation and the re-emergence of Gurle and 
Shaw (1960) resuscitated monetary economic from it coma. The cminal 
urvey paper by Gertler (1988), followed by th di intermediation proce 
that accompanjed the U.S. lowdown in the earl y 1990 , made econorni t 
interested once more in further integrating monetary economic wi th linancial 
intermediation to trace out the macroeconomic effects and policy implica tions 
of monetary economics. As cogently ummarized in Bcrnanke and Gertler 
(1995), the " black box'' of the monetary tran mi ·ion mechani m wa a 
worthy topic of inquiry-and macroeconomic , monetary economics, and 
policymaki ng found a useful focal point in the ex ternal linance premium-
that is, the extent to which external financing is more costly ~Jan internal 
financing. The result was that the study of monetary economic became 
li lled with more "channel " than my satellite television ervice. 
And then the pendulum swung agrun, the turning point somewhat 
inadvertently being John Taylor's (1993) contribution to formalizing an 
interest rate, rule-based approach to monetary policy that incorporated a low 
inflation objective. The monetary economics literature deci ively changed 
course and moved toward the building of small , theory-ba ed models that 
were useful for pobcy, in which expectations were ex plici tly incorporated. 
The byproduct was an analytic treatment of Federal Reserve objective. 
as well as the rule-based procedure for implementing monetary policy ~1a1 
were model-based. This literature was synthesized and standardized in the 
survey by Clarida, Galj , Gertler (1999) and has come to its logical conclusion, 
ad absurdum, in Woodford 's (2003) tome. 
In my opinion, though, this recent fad of monetary economics has 
swung too far away fTom money. Now I know ~1at the monetary aggregates 
can often let us down, and I appreciate how financial innovation ha made 
real econom ic transactions more cashless; but if we throw money _out. of the 
models-and banking, credit and financial intermediation along WJ~l '1-:-
we return to the world outside the " black box," where it becomes fashwnuble 
A d th t leaves us para-once more to talk exclusively about the IS curve. n a ·. · ' 
doxical ly enough back in a world of optimal control and line-!Umng of 
. ' Jd h t HPT inherited when they 
mterest rates that is reminiscent of the wor t a . 1, 
came to the Board, albeit now with underlying models based on SJmp e 
theory. . be e 
. . k n this pomt caus 
I do not think that I am JUSt belllg cran Y 0 · 1 book will 
. . w od~ d's (2003) semma 
a qUick examination of the mdex to 0 or . d 1 hJ·s book· r ted in the Ill ex 0 . bear me out. The following terms are not IS . . ed ' t'on" and 
"banking " "credit " " intermediation," " linancml Jllterm 13 
1 
d' 
' . ' II the terms that rew us 
"external finance premium." And these w~re a ed ·ust a decade ago. 
into the " black box" of how monetarY po!Jcy wor~ J p,·rst upon how 
. th f 11 wing questiOnS. • Thelf absence also leads me to e 0 0 d hould central banks 
J• y stand? Secon , s . . ? many pillars should monetary po JC · , finan cial intcrmcdJatJon · 
be alth f the economy s · also concerned with the he 0 'ded useful informauon 
1 have prov1 For historically, the monetary aggrega es 
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for the formation of poticy during unusual episodes of inflation a d d fl · 
. . n e auon 
as well as pen ods of fi nancial stress. 
It is in Jj ght of these two ques tions that Marvin Goodfriend' 
"N . M B . . s paper, 
an ow oney, road Money, and the Transmi SS ion of Monetary Pol' " 
· b th f f · · Jcy, ~ s a rea . o res.h au. For ultimately, we must apply the discipline of 
Implementing opttmal robust monetary policy, albeit with a short-term 
in terbank interest rate, in a monetary model in which fi nancial intermediati 
. k . 00 JS ta en sen ously. And that is what Marvin 's paper does. Of course, not to be 
outdone, Marvin embraces this mission with gusto-perhaps a bit too much. 
So there is a plethora of assets and their associated prices to keep track 
of in the paper which has few shortcuts and tittle hand wavino 
o · 
The setup of Marvin 's model is as follows: Households face idiosyn-
cratic risk to their incomes and must choose consumption and their portfolio 
composition before this risk is realjzed. Hence, households take out loans to 
finance their interest-earnjng deposits, and they pay an overdraft fee if they 
have too few deposits. Banks are not ciphers here as they take on deposits as 
li abili ties, but on their asset side they hold required reserves as well as loans, 
which are produced with monjtoring effort and collateral made up of capi tal 
and government bonds. Households choose the amount of currency (c), 
loan-monitoring hours (m), loans (L) , deposi ts (D), government bonds (B), 
and capital to hold next period (K), to max imize their utility subject to the 
standard household budget constraints as well as to the fact that the bank's 
balance sheet must be balanced. Clearly, an external fi nance premium devel-
ops between the interest rate on loans and deposits because banks must be 
compensated fo r the service they provide in morutoring loans with effort and 
co llateral. 1 In equilibrium, asset prices are deterrruned for loans, deposits, 
government bonds and capital, and the overall price level and equilibrium 
amount of moru toring effort are determined. 
One of the fu ndamental benefi ts of the paper is that by allowing 
fo r fi nancial intermediation, the demand for and supply of broad money is 
rein troduced to policy-oriented macroeconomics after its untimely, though 
temporary, demise-see Friedman (2004) for a premature obituary of the 
LM curve.2 
Rather than focus on Marvin 's intellectual odyssey, I think that 
it is essential to the legacy of HPT that the poticy implications from hi ~ paper 
should be the focal point of my remaining discussion. To focus the policy 
implications, let's just trace through two types of shocks that policymakers 
I. Note that lhe external fi nance premium is motivated by a moral-hazar~- lype 
. h h ther mouvanons argument rather than an adverse selecuon argument. As sue , t ere are o 
for lhe external fi nance premium thai are not considered in this paper. h ear your 
? To be fair Dale Henderson pointed to the fac i that James Tobin, now ere n Ihe 
- ·. .' . · d kei condiuons m 
run-of-the-m1U monetanst emphas1zed the role of financ1al an asset mar Iary 
. ' . d d kh model of mone conduci of monetary policy. Nevertheless, smce the stan ar wor orse . 1 beled policy now appears to be a model with no money and ?? .LM curve and IS ciC:Iyal t monetarists, 
New Keynesian, I think that it is fair Io say thai my cnuc1sm would be made Y 
even if it would also be made by some non-monetarists as weU. 
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rou tinely face: (1) a banking hock (thar is, a hock to financial irllemledia-
tion, F) and (2) a shock to the expected future price of capi tal (tl1at i , 
a temporary shocks to output, E1 q1+ 1) . Both shock aredi cus ed in 
Marv in 's paper, though the model's policy implications are underplayed. 
In considering the optimal policy response, let's also keep in mind how 
the policy response in Marvin' paper conu·asts with current central bank 
philosophy. 
Let's first trace out the central bank 's optimal response to a tempo-
rary shock to intermediation-for example, an output shock, as discussed 
in sec ti on 8.3 of the paper. In this example, an excess demand for loans can 
be generated in several ways, but let's consider the one when it is generated 
by a negative shock to the production of loans as embodied by a fall in F.3 
Clearly, the reduction in the supply of loans is partially offset by an increased 
effort to make loans, m, but ultimately the reduction in the abiljty to make 
loans leads to an increased premium on loans, a reduction in tlw demand for 
reserves, and a reduction in broad Jjquidity. The policy respon e i to reduce 
the interbank lending rate to help offset the resulting contraction in the . 
balance sheet of the banking sector. In a broader context, tl1e weakness 10 the 
banking sector results in a decljne in broad liquidity, and the Fed's response 
of lowering the interbank rate helps to rellate this sector of the economy. 
while keeping inflation on target. Overall, thjs is not a bad recountrng ol the 
. . . . r th early Federal Reserve's policy response to the savmgs and loan cnsls o c .. 
1990s. Clearly, broad money played a role in signaling tl1~ nature of th~ cnsls, 
and banking and financial matters definjtely were in play 10 the FOMC s 
decisionmaking, a factor that is lost in monetary models that do not have 
banking, credit , or fi nance. . d fi wre 
The second shock I want to discuss is a shock to tlle expect~ u 
. I f tlle market for capllal, pnce of capital. Given the intertempora nature o . . . 
f . . . I I , d t , dechne 10 the current a all rn the expected future pnce of capita ea s 0 a 
price of capital wruch is discussed in section 8.1 of the paper. As adconl ~e1'-, . d. ted · an w 11 c 
quence, collateral fail s and the loan supply process rs lsrup ' ·um 
I ' d th external finance preml . oan monitoring ri ses in response, so oes e b d 1. uidity provision A · d ,. · collateral roa rq ccordrngly, in response to the ec we 111 ' 1 1 bank true to 
· h r 11 10 keep the cen ra IS ampered, and the interbank rate must ,a This scenario 
. . nfl h ~ II . demand for reserves. ~ ts 1 ation target and to offset I e a 111 . f 2001 in which once again 
IS also reasonably consistent with the recess1.011 0 . fi ' c1·al distress and b I . SlgnaiJng man 
road liquidity played an important ro e 111 • 1 characteristics of the FOMC decisions were driven by more than SllllP e 
Taylor rule 
. . several shock.~ IO the 
------- · ul!aneousty considers from 1hc 
3. To be clear, Goodfriend 's paper S l~l side (velocity shocks), ~d so~n':onmcnl 
broad )jquidi ty sector. Some are from the deman F d regulalory changes 1n the 0 1 the 
supply side (changes in I he produclion of loans, ' an reserve rcquiremenJS,." ).rb n: lending 
such as changes in capital standards, y, and ~hang~:scs for the short- t~rm. 101~ic::!ons are quile 
changes to F and y lead to unambiguous policy res the papc~ as the policy ,mp 
rate. Such differences should be explained bener 10 ' 
imponant 
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While M arvin ' s paper is helpful in pointing to the role that creclit 
and banki ng condi tions can pl ay in the formulation of monetary poljcy-
indeed even in a monetary policy that is conducted through an interbank 
market for reserves-it does not give an economic assessment of how impor-
tant thi s relationsl1ip is. For instance, calculating some theoretical impulse 
responses· from a calibrated version of thi s model would be quite useful for 
tru ly judging the mode l' s contribution. ln other words, the theory in Marvin 's 
paper re minds us of the quali tati ve aspects of the lin k between monetary 
policy and banking, but it would also be bene fi cial to measure the quant.itati vc 
aspec t o f thi s relationship as well. 
In conclusion, Marvin ' s paper re minded me of the best aspects 
o f working as an economist at the Federa l Reserve Board . Important poljcy 
ques tions were always on the table, and theoretical approaches to answering 
them were given a voice by Dale, Dick, and Peter. They should be proud 
of the ir contributions to poljcy and the po(jcymaking process , and they should 
know that they have our thanks fo r paving the road to a better monetary 
poli cy environment. 
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